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Abstract 
Can a merger from duopoly to monopoly be detrimental for profits? This paper deals with 
this issue by focusing on the interaction between decreasing returns to labour (which 
imply firms’ convex production costs) and centralised unionisation in a differentiated 
duopoly model. It is pointed out that the wage fixed by a monopoly central union in the 
post-merger case is higher than in the pre-merger/Cournot equilibrium, opening up the 
possibility  that  merger  reduces  profits.  Indeed,  it  is  shown  that  this  “reversal  result” 
actually  applies  when  the  central  union  is  sufficiently  little  interested  to  wages  with 
respect to employment. Moreover, the lower the degree of substitutability between firms’ 
products and the higher the workers’ reservation wage, the higher ceteris paribus the 
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1  Introduction 
 
Since the seminal paper by Salant et al. (1983), the question whether a merger that is wholly anti-
competitive  is  profitable  has  been  increasingly  addressed.  Particularly,  Salant  et  al.  (1983) 
developed a model with homogeneous goods, Cournot competition, linear demand and constant as 
well as exogenously given marginal costs, showing that mergers that almost lead to a full-blown 
monopoly would be profitable.
1 
In this paper, we study if the result that a merger leading to a monopoly is always profitable 
remains true in a Cournot duopoly model, in which production costs are endogenously fixed by a 
common upstream monopoly supplier and the factor input displays diminishing returns. 
In particular, following the established literature on unionised oligopolies (e.g. Horn and 
Wolinsky  1988;  Dowrick  1989;  Naylor  1999;  Correa-López  and  Naylor  2004;  Brekke  2004; 
Lommerud et al. 2005; Correa-López 2007; Symeonidis 2010), we consider a Cournot duopoly 
market game, in which wages are no longer exogenously given for firms, but they are the outcome 
of a strategic game played between firms and a centralised (industry-wide) labour union before the 
former take production decisions. Indeed, centralised wage setting assumes particular relevance in 
concentrated industries (such as duopolies). This is because the characteristics of the latter increase 
the  likelihood  of  union  success  in  organizing  at  the  industry  level  as  well  as  to  maintain  its 
monopolistic position over time (see, e.g., Wallerstein 1999 further than the seminal papers by 
Segal 1964 and Weiss 1966).
2 
                                                 
1 Literally, “[m]erger to monopoly is always profitable. When all the firms in an n-firm equilibrium collude, 
so that there are no outsiders, profits must increase, since joint profits will then be maximized” (Salant et al. 
1983, p. 193). At the same time, they also demonstrated that only when a very large share of the market 
merges could the participants earn profits as a result of the merger, giving rise to the literature on the 
so-called “merger paradox” (see, e.g., Deneckere and Davidson 1985; Perry and Porter 1985; Farrell and 
Shapiro 1990a, 1990b; McAfee and Williams 1992; Heywood and McGinty 2007). As will be clarified later, 
by considering the case of a merger between duopolists, this paper does not deal with the merger paradox. 
2 This is also consistent with the dominant (even if not unanimous) view that wages tend to be higher in more 
concentrated  industries  (e.g.  Blanchflower  1986;  Dickens  and  Katz  1987;  Belman  1988).  For  instance, 
Belman (1988) showed that the elasticity of the wage with respect to market concentration (concentration’s 
effect) is positive and much of concentration’s effect is indirect, that is, it is mediated through unionisation.   2 
Starting from the seminal work by Horn and Wolinsky (1988), extensions of the question 
raised by Salant et al. (1983) to unionised or vertically related industries have attracted considerable 
attention. Particularly, Horn and Wolinsky (1988, Section 5) first showed that when products are 
substitutes and a common upstream input supplier bargains separately with downstream firms over 
a uniform input price (with input supplier and downstream firms having equal bargaining power), 
the profit of a downstream monopoly is less than the total downstream industry’s profit when it is a 
duopoly. This is because the bargained price under downstream monopoly is higher than under 
downstream duopoly and this more than offset the usual gains from monopolising the downstream 
industry. 
However,  in  relation  to  Horn  and  Wolinsky’s  (1988)  above  finding,  the  context  with  a 
monopoly  central  union  (common  input  supplier),  treated  in  this  work,  represents  a  very 
challenging  situation.  Indeed,  it  is  a  limiting  case  of  a  scenario  where  wage  negotiations  are 
centralised at the industry level
3 and Dhillon and Petrakis (2002) have shown that in such a scenario 
(which is clearly different from that considered by Horn and Wolinsky (1988) where agents bargain 
individually)  a  well-known  “wage  rigidity  result”  applies:  under  fairly  general  conditions,  the 
competitive regime facing downstream firms has no effect on the wage. In turn, this should imply 
that, since wages are the same under downstream duopoly and downstream monopoly, a merger 
between downstream firms is always profitable.
4 
  Due to the considerations summarised above, the idea that a “merger profitability result” is 
foregone in a duopoly industry where a monopoly union sets input price (wage) is clearly present in 
a  number  of  more  recent  works.  For  instance,  Brekke  (2004)  and  Lommerud  et  al.  (2005) 
investigate downstream mergers with upstream monopoly unions and, although they contemplate 
the central union case, mainly concentrate on plant-specific and firm-specific unions (for which 
Dhillon and Petrakis’s (2002) “wage rigidity result” does not apply). Particularly, Brekke (2004) 
specifically refers to the hospital industry, showing that “if hospitals compete in prices and quality, 
and the wage is set by a central union, a merger will not influence the wage and the results [among 
which, that hospitals merger is always profitable] are still valid” (Brekke 2004, Proposition 1). 
                                                 
3 Clearly, this is the case where the central union, representing all workers, has all the bargaining power vis-
à-vis the employer federation, representing all firms in the industry (e.g. Dowrick 1989). 
4 Notice that this also implies that by continuity the result against merger profitability does not apply even if, 
as in Horn and Wolinsky (1988), the central union bargains separately with each single firm, provided that 
the union’s bargaining power is sufficiently large.   3 
Lommerud et al. (2005), instead, develop an unionised oligopoly model including a non-merging 
firm (an oligopoly with three rather than two firms) and focalise on the merger between a domestic 
firm and either another domestic firm or a foreign firm, concluding that the equilibrium market 
structure is very likely a cross-border merger. Furthermore, similarly to Brekke (2004), they point 
out that in the presence of a central union (industry-specific input supplier) “a merger would not 
affect input prices at all” (Lommerud et al. 2005, p. 732).
5 
In order to fly in the face of conventional result that under a monopoly central union the 
competitive  regime  facing  downstream  firms  has  no  effect  on  the  wage,  hence  a  downstream 
merger  from  duopoly to  monopoly  is  always  profitable,  we  depart  from  the  previous  literature 
mentioned  above  by  assuming  that  firms’  production  technology  exhibits  decreasing  returns  to 
labour,  which  implies  that  firms  face  with  convex  costs  (increasing  marginal  costs).  Indeed, 
although the tremendous growth experienced over the last decades by this strand of IO literature, 
the effects produced by introducing labour decreasing returns in a unionised oligopoly framework 
have so far not been investigated.
6 
The role of increasing marginal costs in relation to merger issues in oligopolistic markets is 
studied  by  Perry  and  Porter  (1985)  and  Heywood  and  McGinty  (2007).  However,  they  do  not 
consider the role of unions in determining firms’ production costs (wages), thus in their models 
(convex) costs are exogenously given. Moreover, their analyses focalise on the so-called “merger 
                                                 
5 See also Symeonidis (2010). Although the latter does not assume a monopoly union but consider a model 
with wage bargaining between firms and rent-maximising union(s), he also argue that the case with industry-
wide upstream agent (union) is “straightforward [since] when firms participate in centralised bargaining 
before competing in the downstream market […] the input price is the same whether the downstream firms 
merge or not” (Symeonidis 2010, p. 234). 
6 An exception is Fanti and Meccheri (2011) in which decreasing returns to labour have been introduced in a 
unionised duopoly model in order to compare profits under Cournot and Bertrand competition. In particular, 
it is shown that decreasing returns tend to reinforce the mechanisms that contribute to the “reversal result” 
(i.e. higher profits under Bertrand instead of under Cournot competition), making this event possible for a 
wider  range  of  situations,  with  respect  to  those  identified  by  the  previous  literature  (Correa-López  and 
Naylor 2004).   4 
paradox”,  hence  neglecting  the  case  of  a  merger  from  duopoly  to  monopoly.
7 This  produces 
important aspects that differentiate our work from theirs. Most notable, while in their frameworks 
the role of convex costs is studied in relation to the possibility to solve the paradox, that is, to 
restore the merger profitability (even when the merger does not lead to a full-blown monopoly), in 
our model, as we will show, convex costs (labour decreasing returns) play instead the “opposite” 
role: they (as well as unionised labour markets) are necessary to establish the result that merging 
from duopoly to monopoly can actually be detrimental for profits. 
Our main outcomes can be summarised as follows. Firstly, we show that in our framework a 
wage rigidity result only applies under labour constant returns (linear costs), while it vanishes by 
introducing labour decreasing returns (convex costs) into the analysis.
8 In particular, in the latter 
case,  we  find  that  the  post-merger  wage  fixed  by  the  central  union  is  higher  than  in  the  pre-
merger/Cournot equilibrium, opening up the possibility that merger reduces profits. Furthermore, 
we highlight that the post/pre-merger wage differential depends on product market as well as labour 
market parameters. 
Secondly, moving from the outcome decribed above, we demonstrate that the decision by 
firms of whether merging or not is actually affected by the central union’s orientation towards 
wages  with  respect  to  employment  as  well  as  by  the  degree  of  firms’  product  differentiation. 
Particularly,  we  show  that  the  “reversal  result”  (i.e.  merging  from  duopoly  to  monopoly  is 
detrimental for profits) actually holds true when the union is sufficiently little interested to wages 
with respect to employment. Moreover, the lower the degree of product substitutability and the 
higher the workers’ reservation wage, the higher ceteris paribus the probability that profits reduce 
as a result of the merger. 
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 a duopoly model with 
a monopoly central union is developed and the corresponding equilibrium outcomes are derived for 
the  pre-merger  and  post-merger  cases,  respectively.  In  Section  3  the  analysis  of  the  merger 
                                                 
7 Consider a market with n independent firms. Following Salant et al.’s (1983) seminal work, “the merger 
paradox” implies that if m firms merge, then merging is not profitable for firms that participate whenever m 
< 0.8n. Clearly, the merger paradox does not refer to the case analysed in this paper, where m = n (= 2). 
8 Brekke (2004) also obtains that the wage rigidity result does not apply when firms (hospitals) compete in 
quality under regulated prices. However, while in our case diminishing returns to labour play a crucial role, 
Brekke (2004) holds the constant returns standard assumption, hence the mechanism behind his result is 
clearly different from ours.   5 
profitability is conducted. Finally, Section 4 concludes, while the final Appendix provides further 
results, which are useful for the analysis conducted in the main text. 
 
2  The model 
 
We consider a differentiated product market where each firm sets its output – given pre-determined 
wages – to maximize profits (that is, compete à la Cournot). Products are assumed to be (imperfect) 
substitute and characterised by a symmetric demand system, where the inverse demand function for 
brand i is linear and given by: 
 
(1)   
  
pi(qi, q j)  =  1 qi   q j  
 
and a corresponding demand structure for the other firm j (brand j), with qi, qj denoting outputs by 
firm i and j (i, j = 1, 2 with i ≠ j), respectively. The parameter γ ∈ (0, 1), instead, is a measure of 
substitutability  in  demand  between  products.  Particularly,  if γ  →  0 the  brands  are  regarded  as 
unrelated, whereas γ → 1 corresponds to the case of homogeneous goods. As usual, we assume that 
labour  is  the  sole  productive  input.  As  already  discussed  in  the  Introduction,  related  literature 
generally  assumes  constant  returns  to  labour  too.  However,  also  a  decreasing returns  to  labour 
technology is rather realistic and thus in this paper we hypothesise that the two firms face with the 
same technology which, for the representative firm i, is summarised by the following production 
function: 
 
(2)   
  
qi = Li  
 
with Li represents the units of labour employed by the firm i. The choice of the specific technology 
represented by (2) allows for the achievement of analytical results and amount to say that firms 
have quadratic costs, which is the typical example of convex costs in the literature. 
The following rules of the game are applied: at stage 1, the firms decide to merge or not; at 
stage 2, the central union sets wages; finally, at stage 3, the firms set quantity. The game is solved 
by  backwards  induction  and  decisions  are  taken  at  each  stage  anticipating  the  outcome  of 
subsequent stages (also note that employment is indirectly determined at stage 3 of the game).   6 
In  particular,  at  stage  2,  we  assume  that  a  “monopolistic”  industry-wide  union  fixes  a 
uniform  wage  for  this  industry  wi  =  wj  =  w.  As  known,  union  objectives  are  not  necessarily 
dominated by wages. In order to derive tractable results for wage determination, we consider that 
union utility takes the following Stone-Geary functional form (e.g. Dowrick and Spencer 1994): 
 
(3)   
  
V = (w   w°)
  L 
 
where  L  is  the  overall  employment  in  the  industry,  w  is  the  union’s  wage  and  w°  ≥ 0   is  the 
reservation wage, which may be assumed to be higher in industries with a higher fraction of skilled 
manpower (e.g. Pencavel 1985; Dowrick and Spencer 1994). Instead, θ represents the weight placed 
by the union over wage with respect to employment. For instance, a value of θ = 1 refers to the rent-
maximising case,
9 while smaller (larger) values of θ imply that the union is less (more) concerned 
about wages and more (less) concerned about jobs. In particular, in order to preserve the economic 
meaningfulness of our results, in what follows we will assume that θ ∈ (0, 2).
10 
In particular, since workers are organised in a industry-wide union, in the pre-merger game, 
the  union  will  set  a  wage  w  so  as  to  maximise 
  
V
C = (w   w°)
 (Li
C + L j
C) anticipating  labour 




C),  from  the  standard  Cournot  or  pre-merger 
market  game.  In  the  post-merger game,  instead,  the  union  will  set  a  wage  so  as  to  maximise 
  
V
M = (w   w°)
  L
M , where L
M is the anticipated labour demand of the merged firm. 
Finally, at stage 3, firms optimally choose the output (and factor input) levels given the 
technology and factor prices as determined at the prior stage. Clearly, the optimal output choices 
depend on the fact that decisions are taken by two independent firms (pre-merger or Cournot case) 
or instead by a single merged firm (post-merger case). 
 
2.1  Pre-merger (Cournot) case 
 
In the pre-merger game, at stage 3, the firm i chooses quantity qi to maximise: 
 
                                                 
9 Remarkably, in this latter case the union maximisation problem is equivalent to the one facing a profit 
maximising upstream monopoly that is allowed to set the price of an input it supplies to downstream firms. 
10 Notice that Pencavel (1985) argues for an empirical value of θ generally not higher than one.   7 
(4)   
  
  i = piqi   wqi
2. 
 
From (1) and (4), under profit-maximization, the firm i’s best-reply function is: 
 
(5)   
  
qi (q j)  =  




hence, as expected, the best-reply functions are downward-sloping. From (5) and its equivalent for 
the firm j, we get firms’ output as a function of the wage w chosen by the union at the previous 
stage as: 
 
(6)   
  
qi(w) = q j(w) =
1
2(1+ w)+  
. 
 
As regards wage setting at stage 2, after substitution of (6) in union utility function (taking 
into account that Li = qi
 2) and maximising we obtain the equilibrium wage chosen by the union as 
given by: 
 








where the superscript C recalls that it is obtained under Cournot competition in the product market 
(that is, it refers to the pre-merger case). Finally, by substituting for (7), we get the firm i’s pre-
merger equilibrium output and profits as, respectively: 
 
(8)   
  
qi




2 2(1+ w°)+   [ ]
 
(9)   
  
  i
C =   j
C =  
C =
(2  ) 4(1+ w°)+    [ ]




   8 
2.2  Post-merger case 
 
In the post-merger game, the merged firm is a multi-plant monopoly that, at stage 3 of the game, 
sets outputs to maximise: 
 
(10)   
  
  =   i +   j = (piqi   wqi
2)+ (p jq j   wq j
2) 
 
yielding the following outcomes in terms of overall quantity (as a function of the wage): 
 








In this case, taking (11) (and L = q
 2) into account, the equilibrium wage chosen by the union 
at stage 2 is: 
 








Substituting  for  (12),  the  following  post-merger  equilibrium  firm’s  output  and  profits, 
respectively, are obtained: 
 





2(1+ w°+  )
 









3  Merger profitability 
 
Armed with previous findings, in this section we investigate the issue of the merger profitability in 
the  presence  of  a  monopoly  central  union  and convex  costs.  Furthermore,  we  also  address  the 
                                                 
11 Clearly, due to the firms’ symmetric position, we have that qi(w) = qj(w) = q(w)/2.   9 
important question whether and how, with respect to the case in which the wage is exogenously 
given, the profitability of a merger can be affected. We first define some preliminary outcomes, 
which are useful for the analysis that follows. 
 
Lemma 1. Overall quantity produced by the merged firm is less than that produced when firms are 
independent.  This  also  implies  that  price  is  higher  in  the  post-merger  case.  Moreover,  the 
(negative) output differential is increasing in γ and decreasing in θ and w°. 
 
Proof. Lemma 1 simply derives by noting that: 
 
  
 q = q
M  2q
C =  
 (2  )
2 2(1+ w°)+   [ ] 1+ w°+   ( )
< 0,  for any w°> 0,    (0,1) and     (0,2) 
 
which also implies that, 
  






(2  )  
2  2 2w°(2+ w°) [ ]
2A
2B












 (2  ) 4(1+ w°)+ 3  [ ]
2A
2B




A   2(1+ w°)+   [ ] and B   1+ w°+   ( ). 
Q.E.D. 
 
Indeed, as pointed out by the previous literature (e.g. Heywood and McGinty 2007, p. 345), 
if the output of the merged firm remained identical to the sum of that of its constituent pre-merger 
firms (and the wage did not change because the merger) the total cost to produce that output would 
be  unchanged  and,  as  a  consequence,  the  merger  by  itself  does  not  immediately  provide  cost 
savings. Hence, the point of the merger remains to reduce output (and increase price) to exploit 
market  power.  Furthermore,  according  to  Lemma  1,  this  possibility  increases  as  long  as 
substitutability  of  products  by  merging  firms  increases.  This  is  because  competition  between 
independent  firms  is  fiercer  when  products  are  higher  substitutes  (i.e.  for  higher  γ’s  values), 
resulting in higher output levels. By contrast, the output differential, hence the ability of the merger 
to  exploit  market  power,  decreases  when  the  union’s  orientation  towards  wages  as  well  as  the 
workers’ reservation wage increase.   10 
  Moreover, in this context, we obtain another important (and, in the presence of a monopoly 
central  union,  rather  novel)  result,  namely  the  merger  affects  the  equilibrium  wage  too.  The 
following statement affirms such a finding. 
 
Lemma  2.  The  post-merger  wage  is  always  higher  than  when  the  firms  are  independent. 
Furthermore, the wage differential is increasing in γ and θ. 
 
Proof. Taking (7) and (12) into account, we get: 
 
  
 w = w




> 0,  for any     (0,1) and     (0,2) 
 
which clearly implies also 
  
 ( w)/   > 0 and 
  
 ( w)/   > 0, 
  
for any     (0,1) and     (0,2). 
Q.E.D. 
 
Lemma 2 deserves some more comments because, as already stressed in the Introduction, 
the fact that the merger affects the wage sets by a central union is rather novel from a theoretical 
viewpoint.
12 Indeed,  a  common  result  by  the  received  literature  is  that,  under  fairly  general 
conditions, the competitive regime facing downstream firms has no effect on the wage when firms 
participate  in  centralised  bargaining  before  competing  in  the  downstream  market.  In  particular, 
Dhillon and Petrakis (2002) show that a “wage rigidity result” holds in unionised markets for a 
number  of  product  market  features  as  well  as  bargaining  models,  as  long  as  negotiations  are 
centralised at the industry level and, obviously, monopoly union represents a limiting case (with 
union having all bargaining power vis-à-vis firms) of such a situation. Thus the common result is 
that the labour price fixed by a central union is the same regardless of whether it faces one merged 
firm or two competing firms, which also implicitly means that the wage elasticity is unchanged as a 
result of the merger. 
                                                 
12 From an empirical research perspective, instead, the wage effects of mergers are rather controversial. For 
instance, Cremieux and Van Audenrode (1996) and Peoples et al. (1993) found support for a wage cut 
following a merger, while McGuckin et al. (1995) obtained the opposite result. Hekmat (1995) founds no 
evidence of any link between mergers and wages, while Gokhale et al. (1995) found no or only limited 
evidence of a link between takeovers and wages.   11 
Indeed, we may state that, in general (i.e. regardless of the specific technology), the net 
effect  of  a  merger  on  the  wage  elasticity  may  be  disentangled  as  follows  (e.g.  Brekke  2004; 
Lommerud  et  al.  2005).  From  one  hand,  since  for  a  given  wage  a  merger  induces  an  output 
reduction (see Lemma 1) there is a “demand shifting effect” which implies a lower demand for 
labour. In turn, this drives the central union to lower wages to dampen the reduction in employment. 
From the other hand, a merger also causes a change in the slope of the labour demand curve. In 
particular, the previous literature has shown as the labour demand curve’s slope becomes steeper 
after a merger, implying that the demand of labour becomes less responsive to changes in the wage 
level.  Thus  a  central  union  may  increase  wages  without,  ceteris  paribus,  loosing  too  much 
employment. As provided by Dhillon and Petrakis (2002), these two opposing effects on wages 
exactly offset each other for several market characteristics and bargaining settings. 
However, in our framework with decreasing returns to labour the central union does no 
longer charge the same wage independently from the degree of market competition. Indeed, we 
obtain that the merger effect that makes the labour demand curve steeper outweighs the “demand 
shifting effect”, producing an increase of the wage after the merger. In other words, defining with 
  
  
the  wage  elasticity,  we  find  that 
  
 
M <  
C  (a  formal  proof  is  provided  in  the  final  Appendix, 
Section A.1, where the crucial role of decreasing returns to labour in obtaining such a result is also 
highlighted). Therefore, the net effect of a merger on the wage elasticity is to make employment 
less  responsive  to  wage  changes,  thus  enabling the  monopoly  (central)  union  to increase  wage 
claims. Furthermore, since the wage always increases after the merger, this also could make the 
merger less profitable with respect to the case in which the wage is exogenously given. 




(15)   
  
   =  
M  2 
C =
 (2  )     (1+ w°+  ) [ ]
4 2(1+ w°)+   [ ]




                                                 
13 The critical comparison determining the profitability of merger is between the profit earned by the post-
merger firm and the sum of profits earned by the independent firms before the merger, the latter representing 
the merger (overall) opportunity-cost. Indeed, there is profit from merger only when this value is positive.   12 
 








   
 
1+ w°+  
. 
 
From (16), it clearly appears that the union should be not excessively wage oriented for 
post-merger overall profits to be higher than pre-merger ones. For instance, in the simplified case, 
in which the reservation wage is zero and goods tend to be perfect substitutes (i.e. w° = 0, γ → 1), 
the merger is profitable if and only if θ < 0.5. Furthermore, it is easy to check that the threshold 
  
   
is increasing in γ, while it is decreasing with respect to the reservation wage w°. 
The following statement summarises such findings. 
 
Result. Post-merger industry profits are higher than pre-merger industry profits if and only if the 
central union is sufficiently little interested to wages with respect to employment. Moreover, the 
lower  the  degree  of  product  substitutability  and  the  higher  the  workers’  reservation  wage, the 
higher the probability that, ceteris paribus, the merger is detrimental for profits. 
 
Given Lemmas 1 and 2, the Result outlined above is rather intuitive. Indeed, in relation to 
making  the  merger  actually  profitable,  the  role  played  by  γ,  that  is,  the  degree  of  product 
differentiation, is twofold. From one side, according to Lemma 1, when γ increases the (negative) 
output differential increases too, permitting the merged firm to largely exploit market power. On the 
other side, according to Lemma 2, also the wage fixed by the central union increases with γ, hence 
reducing the merger profitability. However, the above result suggests that the former (positive) 
effect always outweighs the latter (negative) effect, implying that, ceteris paribus, the probability 
that merger is actually profitable increases with γ. 
Instead, the role of θ and w° (i.e. the union’s preference for wages with respect to employment 
and the workers’ reservation wage) is clear-cut. Indeed, θ negatively affects the profitability of a 
merger by both reducing the post/pre-merger output differential and increasing the wage differential. 
The workers’ reservation wage, instead, does not affect the wage differential (since the unionised 
wage ultimately results in a mark-up on the reservation wage, thus the latter affecting the pre-
merger and the post-merger wage to the same extent), while it reduces the output differential. Hence,   13 
both tend to hurt the profitability of a merger or, in other words, the higher θ and w°, the lower 
ceteris paribus the probability that merger is actually profitable. 
Figure 1 below provides a graphical illustration of such outcomes. In particular, inside the box, 
all the γ-θ combinations that lie below (above) each curve (linked to a selected value of w°; see the 
figure’s caption for details) are those for which merger is actually profitable (detrimental for profits). 
Clearly, in line with (16), only when θ is sufficiently low the possibility that merger is profitable 
applies. Moreover, since the curves’ slope is positively related to γ, the area below each curve 
becomes larger (i.e. the probability that merger is profitable increases) when product differentiation 
(which is inversely related to γ) decreases. Instead, curves shift downwards when w° increases, 
shirking the area for which merger is profitable, hence making this event less likely. 
 
 
Figure 1: Plot of the “threshold curves” in {γ-θ}-space for different values of w°.
a 
________________________________________ 
a Each curve is drawn for a given value of w° (w° = 0: dash blue; w° = 1: solid green; w° = 10: 
dash dot red). For all γ-θ combinations along each curve, Δπ = 0 (given w°) holds true. For all 
γ-θ combinations below (above) each curve, post-merger profit is higher (lower) than pre-
merger overall profit, that is (given w°), Δπ > (<) 0. 
   14 
Finally,  also  notice  that  when  θ  →  0,  i.e.  the  central  union  tends  to  care  only  about 
employment, the “reversal result” (i.e. merger is detrimental for profits) never applies. Recalling 
that  when  θ  →  0,  w  →  w°,  i.e.  under  both  pre-merger  and  post-merger  cases  the  perfectly 
competitive labour market result is replicated (see also (7) and (12)), this also implies that, in our 
model, labour cost convexity is necessary
14 but not sufficient to trigger the “reversal result”, since 
an unionised labour market is also needed (a formal proof of the fact that with convex labour costs 





5  Conclusion 
 
Can a merger from duopoly to monopoly be detrimental for profits? This paper has dealt with this 
issue  by  focusing  on  the  interaction  between  decreasing  returns  to  labour  (which  imply firms’ 
convex costs) and centralised unionisation in a differentiated duopoly model. Particularly, it has 
been analysed whether a merger may influence the wage choice of a monopoly central union and 
how,  in  turn,  this  may  affect  the  merger  profitability. In  doing  so,  our  work  has  challenged  a 
common wisdom suggesting that centralised wage setting is unaffected by the number of competing 
                                                 
14 Indeed, under constant returns the “wage rigidity result” applies (see Appendix, Section A.1), implying 
that merging is always profitable for duopolists. 
15 As discussed in the Introduction section, the role of  convex costs is also considered by the literature 
analysing a related but different issue, namely the so-called “merger paradox” (e.g. Barry and Porter 1985; 
Heywood and McGinty 2007). In this regards, it is also worth noting that Heywood and McGinty (2007) 
point out that, while a merger of two firms is never profitable in the canonical model of constant marginal 
cost even when there are only three firms in total, when two firms merge under a triopolistic industry the 
merger is profitable in the case of upward sloping marginal costs whenever the wage is sufficiently high. 
Since they abstract from the case of a merger from duopoly to a monopoly, their triopoly case is clearly that 
closer  to  our  model.  However,  in  our  framework,  equilibrium  wages  as  well  as  post-pre  merger  wage 
differential are increasing in θ, implying that merger profitability applies when the wage is sufficiently low, 
which is in sharp contrast with Heywood and McGinty’s (2007) result (which is obtained, however, without 
contemplating the role played by union, hence the possibility that the latter sets different wages according to 
the number of firms it faces with).   15 
firms in the product market and, as a consequence, the presence of a monopoly industry-wide union 
in the labour market cannot modify the general rule that merging from duopoly to monopoly always 
leads to larger overall profits. 
Our results have revealed, instead, that under decreasing returns to labour the presence of a 
centralised wage setting union actually determines the profitability of the merger, hence affecting 
the decision of whether merging or not by firms.
16 This is because the wage fixed by the union in 
the  post-merger  case  is  higher  than  in  the  pre-merger/Cournot  equilibrium,  hence  reducing  the 
profitability of the merger. Furthermore, the post/pre-merger wage differential relates to both the 
union’s  orientation  towards  wages  with  respect  to  employment  and  the  degree  of  product 
differentiation between firms. More in detail, it has been shown that, ceteris paribus, the higher the 
central union orientation towards wages, the workers’ reservation wage and the degree of product 
differentiation, the higher the probability that a “reversal result” (that is, merger is detrimental for 





A.1  Wage elasticity of labour demand under constant and decreasing returns 
 
Here, we analyse the sensitivity to wage changes of the slope of the labour demand curve and the 
wage elasticity of the labour demand (
  
 ), which defines the equilibrium wage choice by the union. 
In particular, we will perform such analysis for both the constant returns to labour case (CRL) and 
the case considered in the main text with decreasing returns to labour (DRL). We will show that, 
while  under  CRL  the  firms’  merger  does  not  modify  the  equilibrium  wage  elasticity  of  labour 




                                                 
16 Notice that while we have derived our results in the case of a monopoly central union, they hold true by 
continuity also in a wage bargaining model, provided that (central) union bargaining power is sufficiently 
large.   16 
i)  CRL 
 
Under CRL, we have qi = Li. Indicating with L
C|CRL the Cournot equilibrium (overall) labour 
demand, the following applies: 
 


















  Instead, by indicating with L
C|CRL the equilibrium post-merger labour demand under CRL, 
we have: 
 

















From (A1) and (A2), it follows that: 
 



















> 0, for any     (0,1). 
 
Hence, the post-merger slope of the demand for labour is steeper than the pre-merger one. 
Moreover, in this case, we also have that: 
 











that  is,  the  wage  elasticity  is  the  same  in  pre-merger  and  post-merger  cases,  implying  that 
equilibrium wages are also the same. 
 
                                                 
17 In order to preserve the economic meaningfulness of results, in this benchmark case with constant returns 
to labour we admit that w < 1. Notice, however, that under decreasing returns to labour such assumption is 
unnecessary for this scope.   17 
ii)  DRS 
 
Now, we indicate with L
C|DRL the Cournot equilibrium labour demand under DRL, getting: 
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while, for the post-merger case, we have: 
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2 +18  +12+ 6w(3  + 4)+12w
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3 > 0, for any w > 0,    (0,1). 
 
Hence, the post-merger slope of the demand for labour is steeper than the pre-merger one. 
Furthermore, we also get: 
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2w
1+ w +  
;  
M
DRL =  
4w









DRL    
C
DRL =  
2w 
2(1+ w)+   [ ] 1+ w +   ( )
< 0, for any w > 0,    (0,1) 
 
that is, the wage elasticity is lower (in absolute value) in the post-merger case, which also implies 
that the post/pre-merger wage differential is positive. 
   18 
A.2  Exogenous wage 
 
We consider here the main results concerning the issue of the merger’s profitability in the model 
with an exogenously given wage (hence, a wage that does not modify as a result of a merger 
between firms in the product market). In particular, without loss of generality, we assume that the 
wage equals the competitive, or reservation, level w° (which also corresponds to the case in which 
firms have all bargaining power vis-à-vis union). In such a case, using (4) and (6), and (10) and (11) 
of Section 2, we obtain that pre-merger (Cournot) equilibrium profit is given by: 
 





2(1+ w°)+   [ ]
2  
 
while the post-merger equilibrium profit is: 
 






2(1+ w°+  )
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Hence, the profit differential is: 
 
(A12)   
  
   =  
M




2 2(1+ w°)+   [ ]
2 1+ w°+   ( )
> 0, for any w°> 0,     (0,1) 
 
which implies that when the wage is exogenous, hence does not change after firms’ merger, the 
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